The Demand for Contingent Claims under Heterogeneous Uncertainty
This section gives an extension of the insurance model considered in Ghossoub [11] to a general setting of demand for claims that pay contingent on the realization of some underlying random variable. This setting can encompass, for instance, models of demand for derivative securities, that is, financial securities that pay contingent on the realization of the (random) price of some underlying stock. The analysis is purposefully kept at a general level, but it can easily be applied to different practical situations.
As in Section 4, S is the set of states of the world and G is a σ-algebra of events on S. Assume that a decision maker (DM) faces a fundamental uncertainty that affects her wealth and consumption. This uncertainty will be modelled as a (henceforth fixed) element X of B`pGq with a closed range r0, M s :" X pSq, where M :" }X} sup ă`8. The DM wishes to purchase from a claim issuer (CI) a claim that pays contingent on the realizations of the underlying uncertainty. For instance, in problems of demand for insurance the uncertainty X can be seen as the underlying insurable loss against which the DM seeks an insurance coverage I˝X. In problems of optimal debt contracting, the uncertainty X can be seen as the interest on a loan, and I˝X as the repayment scheme. Hereafter, I will denote by Σ the σ-algebra σtXu of subsets of S generated by X.
8.1.
Preferences and Utilities. The DM's decision process is assumed to consist in choosing a certain act among a collection of given acts whose realization, in each state of the world s, depends on the value X psq of the uncertainty X is the state s. Formally, the DM and the CI have preferences over acts in a frameworkà la Savage. Here, the set of consequences (or prizes) is taken to be R. Let F denote the collection of all G-measurable functions f : S Ñ R. The elements of choice (or acts) are taken to be the elements of B`pΣq Ă F. The nature of the problem makes this a natural assumption. Indeed, the goal here is to determine the optimal function of the uncertainty, that is, the optimal claim Y :" I˝X P B`pΣq, for some Borelmeasurable map I : X pSq Ñ R`, that will satisfy a certain set of requirements (constraints). The DM's preferences ě DM over B`pΣq and the CI's preferences ě CI over B`pΣq determine their subjective beliefs. These beliefs are represented by subjective probability measures µ and ν, respectively, on the measurable space pS, Σq. Moreover, I will assume the following representations for the preferences: 
is (uniformly) bounded and sequentially continuous in the topology of pointwise convergence.
For instance, if for each Y " I˝X P B`pΣq one has U pX, Y q :" u pa´X`Y q, for some a P R and some continuous bounded utility function u : R Ñ R, then the mapping U pX, .q : B`pΣq Ñ B pΣq is (uniformly) bounded and sequentially continuous in the topology of pointwise convergence. Also, if for each Y " I˝X P B`pΣq one has V pY q :" v pb´Y q, for some b P R and some continuous bounded utility function v : R Ñ R, then the mapping V : B`pΣq Ñ B pΣq is (uniformly) bounded and sequentially continuous in the topology of pointwise convergence.
Given Assumption 8.1, the DM's problem here is choosing the optimal act Y˚P B`pΣq that will maximize her expected utility of wealth, with respect to her subjective probability measure µ.
8.2.
Subjective Beliefs and Vigilance. The subjectivity of the beliefs of each of the DM and the CI is reflected in the different subjective probability measure that each has over the measurable space pS, Σq. I will also make the assumption that the uncertainty X (with closed range r0, M s) has a nonatomic law induced by the probability measure µ. 
Clearly, µ is pµ, Xq-vigilant. In Section 9, I show that in the specific setting where the DM and the CI assign different probability density functions to the uncertainty X with range r0, M s, the assumption of vigilance is weaker than the assumption of a monotone likelihood ratio.
8.3. The DM's Problem. The DM seeks the contingent claim that will maximize her expected utility of wealth, under her subjective probability measure, subject to the CI's participation constraint and to some constraints on the claim. Specifically, the DM's problem is the following:
. By Assumption 8.1, if Problem 8.4 has a nonempty feasibility set then the supremum in Problem 8.4 is finite. Indeed, there is N ă`8 such that for any feasible Y P B`pΣq, one has U pX, Y q psq ď N , for all s P S. Consequently,
Denote by F SB the feasibility set Problem 8.4:
1 Countable additivity of the subjective probability measure representing preferences can be obtained by assuming that preferences satisfy the Arrow-Villegas Monotone Continuity axiom [2, 8, 25] .
In the following, I will assume that this feasibility set is nonempty:
The following result shows that vigilance is sufficient for the existence of a monotone solution to the DM's problem, that is, a solution which is comonotonic with the underlying uncertainty X. The proof is given in Appendix H. In Appendix H.2, I give a general algorithm that can be used to characterize a monotone solution to Problem 8.4. The general procedure is based on the following idea:
(1) Lebesgue's Decomposition Theorem [9, Theorem 4.3.1] suggests a decomposition of the measure ν with respect to the measure µ, whereby one can write ν as a sum of two measures, one of which is absolutely continuous with respect to µ, and the other is mutually singular with µ; (2) This decomposition then suggests a splitting of the initial problem into three subproblems;
(3) A solution of the initial problem is then obtained from the solutions of the other subproblems, combined in an appropriate way.
Vigilance and Monotone Likelihood Ratios
The purpose of this subsection is to show that the assumption of vigilance of beliefs is weaker than the assumption of a monotone likelihood ratio in a setting where the DM and the insurer assign a different probability density function (pdf) to the random loss on its range. Needless to say, this presupposes the existence of such pdf-s. Suppose then that the DM's subjective probability measure µ on pS, Σq is such that the law µ˝X´1 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, with a Radon-Nikodým derivative f , where f ptq is interpreted as the pdf that the DM assigns to the loss X. Similarly, suppose that the insurer's subjective probability measure ν on pS, Σq is such that the law ν˝X´1 is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, with a Radon-Nikodým derivative g, where gptq is interpreted as the pdf that the insurer assigns to the loss X. Then f ptq and gptq are both continuous functions with support r0, M s. LRptq :" gptq{f ptq for all t P r0, M s such that f ptq ‰ 0. Now, define the map Z : S Ñ R`by Z :" LR˝X. Then Z is nonnegative and Σ-measurable, and LR is a nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) function on its domain if and only if Z is comonotonic (resp. anti-comonotonic) with X. Consider the following two conditions that one might impose.
Condition 9.2 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio). LR is a nonincreasing function on its domain.
Condition 9.3 (Vigilance). ν is pµ, Xq-vigilant.
The following proposition shows that the vigilance condition is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio condition in this particular setting, and under a mild assumption. 
Since the function L px, yq is supermodular, as observed above, then Lemma B.5 yields
, one then has ş V pY 2 q Z dµ ě ş V pY 1 q Z dµ, which yields (by two "changes of variable"
3 , and using the definition of f and g as Radon-Nikodým derivatives of µ˝X´1 and ν˝X´1, respectively, with respect to the Lebesgue measure) the following:
as required. Condition 9.3 hence follows from Condition 9.2.
Monotone Comparative Statics under Heterogeneous Uncertainty
This section gives a monotone comparative statics result for a class of demand problems under uncertainty, where this uncertainty is perceived differently by the parties involved, in that they assign different likelihoods to its realizations. The uncertainty is taken as given, and the decision maker's (DM) choice variable is a function of this uncertainty. What guarantees that the DM's optimal choice is a nondecreasing function of this underlying uncertainty?
This problem is an abstraction of many common problems in economic theory that were hitherto only considered in a framework of complete homogeneity of beliefs about the realizations of an underlying uncertainty. It can be formulated as (10.1) sup
where X is a given random variable on a probability space pS, Σ, P q, B pΣq is the linear space of all bounded and Σ-measurable functions on S, Θ Ă B pΣq is a given non-empty constraint set, and U pX, Y q is bounded and Σ-measurable for each Y P Θ. When Θ contains another party's individual rationality constraint (participation constraint), one can distinguish between two types of problems, depending on how the underlying uncertainty is perceived by both parties: (i) either both parties agree on the distribution of this uncertainty (which will hence be induced by the probability measure P ), or (ii) they have different perceptions of such randomness. The first type of problem is one where uncertainty can be called homogeneous, whereas the second type is a problem in which uncertainty can be referred to as being heterogeneous.
Surprisingly, the literature is mostly silent on problems of the form (10.1) where the uncertainty is heterogeneous, whereas problems of the form (10.1) with homogeneous uncertainty are abundant. For example, the vast majority of problems of optimal insurance design, or demand for insurance coverage are based on the classical formulation of Arrow [2] , Borch [6] , and Raviv [20] , and are usually stated as a problem of the form (10.1) with homogeneous uncertainty. That is, both the insurer and the insured share the same beliefs about the realizations of some underlying insurable loss random variable X. As discussed in Ghossoub [11] , monotonicity of an optimal insurance contract Y is typically desired because such contracts can avoid ex-post moral hazard that might arise from a voluntary downward misrepresentation of the loss by the insured.
Problems of debt contracting between investors (lenders) and entrepreneurs (borrowers), such as the ones studied by Gale and Hellwig [10] , Townsend [24] , or Williamson [27] , are also usually stated as a problem of the form (10.1) with homogeneous uncertainty. In this case, a contract specifies the repayment Y that the borrower makes to the lender as a function of the (uncertain) return X on the project being financed. The monotonicity of an optimal contract as a function of the return on investment is a coveted feature since such contracts will be de facto truthtelling, and will avoid any misrepresentation of the profitability of the project by the borrower.
Principal-agent problems have also been traditionally stated as problems of the form (10.1) with homogeneous uncertainty, as in the work of Grossman and Hart [12] , Holmstrom [13] , Mirrlees [17] , Page [18] , or Rogerson [21] , for instance. In that setting, a contract specifies the wage Y that an agent receives from the principal, as a function of the (uncertain) outcome, or output X that occurs as a result of the agent's activity. Since the work of Rogerson [21] , monotonicity of the optimal wage contract in the observed output is usually sought after 4 .
Numerous other problems can be formulated as in (10.1), such as problems of demand for financial securities given a pricing or budgeting constraint, and where monotonicity of an optimal security Y might reflect hedging against X, for example. Whatever the nature of the problem might be, it is interesting to examine under what conditions an optimal choice of the choice variable Y is monotone in the underlying variable X, and the theory of monotone comparative statics has usually been very fruitful in answering questions of this sort.
The Theory of Monotone Comparative Statics and its Limitations.
The importance of monotone comparative statics analyses in economic theory is well-understood. One can even say that at the core of the motivation behind a sizeable collection of problems in economic theory, very often lies the question of whether or not a quantity is a monotone function of a parameter, or whether a variable output changes monotonically with a variable input. This is even more so significant if the monotonicity of an optimal such output as a function of an input parameter is desired, and indeed, monotone comparative statics techniques have proven to be very fruitful (see [23, 26] ). Such techniques can be, and have been used in consumer theory, theory of production, portfolio choice theory, financial economics, and contract theory to answer some basic and intuitive questions.
The theory of monotone comparative statics is typically concerned with the behavior of a solution to a given optimization problem when a primitive of the problem changes. Specifically, let pL, ě L q be a lattice, B Ď L a choice set, pT, ě T q a partially ordered set interpreted as a set of parameters, and f : LˆT Ñ R a given objective function. For the problem of choosing an x P B that maximizes the objective function given a value t of the parameter, the chief concern is the isotonicity of an optimal choice x˚ptq of x as a function of t, that is,
The classical theory of monotone comparative statics [15, 16, 22, 23] seeks conditions on the function f that guarantee that eq. (10.2) holds.
Athey [3, 4, 5] examined a problem of monotone comparative statics in the presence of uncertainty, where the objective function is an integral of some function with respect to some measure. Specifically, let pL, ě L q be a lattice, B Ď L a choice set, S " ś m i"1 S i with S i Ď R for i " 1, . . . , m, Θ Ď R a set of parameters, µ a finite nonnegative product measure on S, and u : LˆS Ñ R and ψ : SˆΘ Ñ R given bounded measurable functions. Define the objective function Φ : LˆΘ Ñ R by Φ px, θq " ż S u px, sq ψ ps, θq dµ psq For the problem of choosing an x P B that maximizes the objective function given a value θ of the parameter, the problem of monotone comparative statics in this situation of uncertainty is to find conditions on the primitives u and ψ so that an optimal choice x˚pθq of x is a nondecreasing function of θ, that is,
In particular, in both situations of certainty and uncertainty, the interest is in the variation of the optimal solution with respect to the lattice order ě L on L, given a variation of the parameter (t or θ, respectively) in the order on the parameter set (ě T or the usual order on R, respectively). Often, however, these notions of order are too strong for the problem under consideration. For instance, in problems of the form (10.1), conditions on the primitive U for the optimal choice Y˚of Y to be monotone in X are desired. Specifically, under what conditions on U do we have that for all s, s 1 P S, X psq ě X ps 1 q ñ Y˚psq ě Y˚ps 1 q? The classical techniques of monotone comparative statics are of no help in these situations since the lattice order on B pΣq is not adequate here. This order ě L on L " B pΣq is defined by sup
where X is a given underlying uncertainty on the measurable space pS, Σ, P q, Y " I˝X is a claim contingent on this uncertainty, ş U pX, I˝Xq dP is a DM's expected utility of wealth with respect to the probability measure P , V : B`pΣq Ñ R is some given mapping, and R P R is fixed.
The first constraint is standard in many problems in economic theory. In the insurance framework [2, 11, 20] , this constraint says that an indemnity is nonnegative and cannot exceed the loss itself. In a framework of debt contracting [10] , this constraint is a limited liability constraint. The second constraint is interpreted as some "aggregation constraint". For instance, in problems of insurance demand, R would be the insurer's reservation utility, and V pI˝Xq would be the insurer's expected utility of wealth with respect to his probability measure. The "aggregation constraint" is then simply the insurer's participation constraint, or individual rationality constraint.
The mapping V : B`pΣq Ñ R need not be law-invariant with respect to 5 P . When V is not law-invariant with respect to P , this creates some heterogeneity in the perception of the uncertainty X, and poses some important mathematical complications. For instance, in the insurance framework, it might be that the DM and the insurer assign different "distributions" to the underlying uncertainty. This section's main result (Theorem 10.3) is that when the mapping V satisfies a property that will be called Vigilance (Definition 10.2) and a property that will be called the Weak DCProperty (Definition 10.1), supermodularity of the function U : R 2 Ñ R (Definition B.3) is sufficient for an optimal choice of Y " I˝X to be a nondecreasing function of the underlying uncertainty X. Roughly speaking, vigilance of the operator V can be understood as a (weak) preference for comonotonicity with X (Definition 4.1), on the collection of all functions that are identically distributed for the probability measure P . Given two elements Y 1 and Y 2 of B`pΣq that have the same distribution with respect to the probability measure P , vigilance of an operator V : B`pΣq Ñ R means that if any one of Y 1 or Y 2 is a nondecreasing function of X, it will assigned a higher value by V than the other function. The Weak DC-Property of an operator roughly means that the operator preserves dominated convergence. This property is satisfied by a large class of operators on B`pΣq, such as the Lebesgue integral or the Choquet integral (Appendix G).
Here, the definition of vigilance is extended from the notion of vigilant beliefs, introduced by Ghossoub [11] , to the concept of a vigilant real-valued mapping ρ on the collection of functions Y over which a decision maker (DM) has a given preference. When ρ pY q " ş Y dP , one will recover Ghossoub's [11] definition of vigilant beliefs as a special case of the definition of vigilance given here (Definition 10.2).
10.3. The Setting. As in Section 4, let S denote the set of states of the world, and suppose that G is a σ-algebra of subsets of S, called events. Denote by B pGq the supnorm-normed Banach space of all bounded, R-valued and G-measurable functions on pS, Gq, and denote by B`pGq the collection of all R`-valued elements of B pGq. For any f P B pGq, the suprnorm of f is given by }f } sup :" supt|f psq| : s P Su ă`8. For C Ď S, denote by 1 C the indicator function of C. For any A Ď S and for any B Ď A, denote by AzB the complement of B in A.
For any f P B pGq, denote by σtf u the σ-algebra of subsets of S generated by f , and denote by B pσtf uq the linear space of all bounded, R-valued and σtf u-measurable functions on pS, Gq. Then by Doob's measurability theorem [1, Theorem 4.41], for any g P B pσtf uq there exists a Borel-measurable map ζ : R Ñ R such that g " ζ˝f . Denote by B`pσtf uq the cone of nonnegative elements of B pσtf uq.
For any f P B pGq, if A is any sub-σ-algebra of G such that σtf u Ď A, and if P is any probability measure on the measurable space pS, Aq, it will be said that f is a continuous random variable for P when the law P˝f´1 of f is a nonatomic Borel probability measure. Recall that a finite nonnegative measure η on a measurable space pΩ, Aq is said to be nonatomic if for any A P A with η pAq ą 0, there is some B P A such that B Ĺ A and 0 ă η pBq ă η pAq.
10.4.
Vigilant Operators and the Weak DC-Property. Let P be a given probability measure on the measurable space pS, Gq. In many situations of choice under uncertainty, the elements of choice are the elements of B`pGq, as in the problem that will be examined in this paper. Often, a problem of choice involving these elements is stated as an optimization problem subject to some constraints. In an abstract form, some of these constraints can be stated in terms of operators ρ : B`pGq Ñ R, and might be called "aggregation constraints". Here I will define two special kinds of these operators. Y n " Y˚(pointwise), and (2) there is some Z P B`pGq such that Y n ď Z, for each n ě 1, the following holds: lim
When ρ is defined as a Lebesgue integral with respect to P , i.e. ρ pY q " ş Y dP for each Y P B`pGq, then Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem [9, Th. 2.4.4] implies that ρ has the Weak DC-Property. More generally, if ρ is a Choquet integral (Appendix G) with respect to some continuous capacity ν on pS, Gq (Definition G.2), i.e. ρ pY q " ű Y dν for each Y P B`pGq, then when seen as an operator on B`pGq, ρ has the Weak DC-Property. This is a consequence of [19, Th. 7.16 ].
Definition 10.2 (Vigilance). Let X be a given element of B`pGq, and recall that P is a probability measure on pS, Gq. Denote by Σ the σ-algebra σtXu of subsets of S generated by X. An operator ρ : B`pΣq Ñ R is said to be pP, Xq-vigilant if for any Y 1 , Y 2 P B`pΣq such that (i) Y 1 and Y 2 have the same distribution under P , i.e. P˝Y´1 1 " P˝Y´1 2 , and, (ii) Y 2 is a nondecreasing function of X, i.e. Y 2 and X are comonotonic, the following holds:
ρ pY 2 q ě ρ pY 1 q
Clearly, if ρ is P -law invariant then it is pP, Xq-vigilant. This covers a large collection of operators on B`pΣq such that a Lebesgue integral with respect to P , a Choquet integral with respect to a distortion of P (Appendix G), and so on. When ρ is not P -law invariant, the same intuition as that behind Ghossoub's [11] definition of vigilance applies here.
A Monotone Comparative Statics
Result. Let X be a given element of B`pGq with closed range X pSq " r0, M s, where M :" }X} sup ă`8. Denote by Σ the σ-algebra σtXu of subsets of S generated by X, and let P be a probability measure on pS, Gq. Let U : R 2 Ñ R be a given function, and let V : B`pΣq Ñ R be a given operator. The random variable X is fixed, and the objects P , U , and V are considered to be the primitives of the following problem:
where R P R is fixed. The following theorem gives sufficient conditions for the optimal choice Y˚of the choice variable Y to be a nondecreasing function of X. The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix I.
Theorem 10.3. If the following hold:
(1) Problem 10.5 has a nonempty feasibility set, ( 2) The Borel probability measure P˝X´1 is nonatomic, A few comments on the assumptions in Theorem 10.3 are in order. First, the assumption of nonemptiness of the feasibility set of Problem 10.5 is made simply to rule out trivial cases where no solution can exist. The assumption of nonatomicity of the law of X is a technical requirement, and it means that the random variable X is diffused enough. This is a very common assumption in many instances, such as when it is assumed that a probability density function for X exists.
The assumption of supermodularity of the mapping U : R 2 Ñ R is not a strong assumption by any means. It is usually given in many situations by the very nature of the problem considered. This happens for instance when U pX, Y q " u pa´X`Y q, for a concave utility function u and some a P R. See Example B.4 (1) . Assumption (4) in Theorem 10.3 is typically obtained whenever U pX, Y q " u pa´X`Y q, for some continuous and bounded utility function u, and some a P R. Assumptions (5) and (6) The capacity ν is said to be (1) Continuous from above if for any sequence tA n u n in G such that A n`1 Ď A n for each n ě 1, one has lim
(2) Continuous from below if for any sequence tA n u n in G such that A n Ď A n`1 for each n ě 1, one has lim
(3) Continuous if it is both continuous from above and continuous from below.
For instance, if P is a probability measure on pS, Σq and T : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s is increasing, with T p0q " 0 and T p1q " 1, then the set function ν :" T˝P is a capacity on pS, Σq. Such a function T is usually called a probability distortion, and the capacity T˝P is usually called a distorted probability measure. If, moreover, the function T is continuous, then the set function ν :" T˝P is a capacity on pS, Σq which is continuous. This is an immediate consequence of the continuity of the measure P for monotone sequences [9, Prop. 1.2.3] and the continuity of T . In particular, any probability measure is continuous. The Choquet integral with respect to a measure is simply the usual Lebesgue integral with respect to that measure [14, p. 59] . Unlike the Lebesgue integral, however, the Choquet integral is not an additive operator on B pΣq. However, the Choquet integral is additive on comonotonic functions (Definition 4.1). For more about capacities and Choquet integrals, I refer to Marinacci and Montrucchio [14] . Proof. Since F SB ‰ ∅, choose any Y " I˝X P F SB , and let r Y µ denote the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y with respect to X. Then (i) r Y µ " r I˝X where r I is nondecreasing, and (ii) 0 ď r Y µ ď X, by Lemma B.6. Furthermore, since ν is pµ, Xq-vigilant, it follows that
is said to be a Pareto improvement of Y 1 (or is Paretoimproving) when the following hold: 
" }X} sup , the sequence tY n u n is uniformly bounded. Moreover, for each n ě 1 one has Y n " I n˝X , with I n : r0, M s Ñ r0, M s. Consequently, the sequence tI n u n is a uniformly bounded sequence of nondecreasing Borel-measurable functions. Thus, by Lemma G. there exists a unique pair pν ac , ν s q of (nonnegative) finite measures on pS, Σq such that ν " ν ac`νs , ν ac ăă µ, and ν s K µ. That is, for all B P Σ with µ pBq " 0, one has ν ac pBq " 0, and there is some A P Σ such that µ pSzAq " ν s pAq " 0. It then also follows that ν ac pSzAq " 0 and µ pAq " 1. Note also that for all Z P B`pΣq, ş Z dν " ş A Z dν ac`ş SzA Z dν s . Furthermore, by the Radon-Nikodým theorem [9, Theorem 4.2.2] there exists a µ-a.s. unique Σ-measurable and µ-integrable function h : S Ñ r0,`8q such that ν ac pCq " ş C h dµ, for all C P Σ. Consequently, for all
In the following, the Σ-measurable set A on which µ is concentrated (and ν s pAq " 0) is assumed to be fixed all throughout. Finally, since A P Σ and since X pSq " r0, M s, X pAq is a Borel subset of r0, M s, as previously discussed.
Lemma H.4. Let Y˚be an optimal solution for Problem 8.4 , and suppose that ν is pµ, Xqvigilant and that U pX, Y q is supermodular. Let r Yμ be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y˚with respect to X. Then:
Yμ is optimal for Problem 8.4; and, 
for some Y1 , Y2 P B`pΣq. Let r Yμ be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y˚with respect to X, and let Y1 ,µ be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y1 with respect to X. Then r Yμ " r Y1 ,µ , µ-a.s.
Proof. Let r
Yμ ,A be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y˚with respect to X on A. Since µ pAq " 1, then by Lemma B.2 one has r Yμ " r Yμ ,A , µ-a.s. Similarly, let r Y1 ,µ,A be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y1 with respect to X on A. Then r Y1 ,µ " r Y1 ,µ,A , µ-a.s. Therefore, it suffices to show that r Yμ ,A " r Y1 ,µ,A , µ-a.s. Since both r Yμ ,A and r Y1 ,µ,A are nondecreasing functions of X on A, then by the µ-a.s. uniqueness of the nondecreasing rearrangement, it remains to show that they are µ-equimeasurable with Y˚on A. Now, for each t P r0, M s, µ´ts P A : r Yμ ,A psq ď tu¯" µ´ts P A : Y˚psq ď tu¯" µ´ts P A : Y1 psq ď tu" µ´ts P A : r Y1 ,µ,A psq ď tuw here the first equality follows from the definition of r Yμ ,A (equimeasurabiltiy), the second equality follows from equation (H.1), and the third equality follows from the definition of r Y1 ,µ,A (equimeasurabiltiy).
Consider now the following two problems:
Problem H.6. For a given β P R,
Remark H.8. By Remark 8.5, the supremum of each of the above two problems is finite when their feasibility sets are nonempty.
Definition H.9. For a given β P R, let:
(1) Θ A,β be the feasibility set of Problem H.6 with parameter β. That is, By Lemma H.13, one can restrict the analysis to solving Problems H.6 and H.7 with a parameter β P Γ. By Lemmata H.4, H.5, and H.13, if ν is pµ, Xq-vigilant, U pX, Y q is supermodular, β˚is optimal for Problem H.12, Y1 is optimal for Problem H.6 with parameter β˚, and Y2 is optimal for Problem H.7 with parameter β˚, then r Yμ is optimal for Problem 8.4, and r Yμ " r Y1 ,µ , µ-a.s., where r Yμ (resp. r Y1 ,µ ) is the µ-a.s. unique nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y˚:" Y1 1 A`Y2 1 SzA (resp. of Y1 ) with respect to X.
Solving Problems H.6 and H.7. Since µ pSzAq " 0, it follows that, for all Y P B`pΣq, one has ş SzA U pX, Y q dµ " 0. Consequently, any Y which is feasible for Problem H.7 with paramter β is also optimal for Problem H.7 with parameter β. Now, for a fixed parameter β P Γ, Problem H.6 will be solved "statewise", as follows:
Lemma H.14. If Y˚P B`pΣq satisfies the following:
(1) 0 ď Y˚psq ď X psq, for all s P A; Proof. Suppose that Y˚P B`pΣq satisfies p1q, p2q, and p3q above. Then Y˚is clearly feasible for Problem H.6. To show optimality of Y˚for Problem H.6 note that for any other Y P B`pΣq which is feasible for Problem H.6 with parameter β, one has, for all s P A, The application of the general algorithm presented above depends on the specific forms of the functions U and V. Depending on the nature of the problem considered, these functions can take different forms, and the algorithm can be carried out further.
